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Human conflict, geopolitical crises, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters can turn large parts of energy
distribution networks offline. Europe’s current gas supply network is largely dependent on deliveries from
Russia and North Africa, creating vulnerabilities to social and political instabilities. During crises, less delivery
may mean greater congestion, as the pipeline network is used in ways it has not been designed for. Given the
importance of the security of natural gas supply, we develop a model to handle network congestion on various
geographical scales. We offer a resilient response strategy to energy shortages and quantify its effectiveness
for a variety of relevant scenarios. In essence, Europe’s gas supply can be made robust even to major supply
disruptions, if a fair distribution strategy is applied.
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Almost everything we do in the course of a day involves the
use of energy. Yet, history has taught us that the threats to the
security of supply come in unexpected ways [1, 2]. Examples
of unforeseen energy crises include the recent disputes between
Russia and Ukraine over the price of natural gas (2005–2006,
2007–2008, 2008–2009) [3], the disruption of the oil and gas
production industry in the US following Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita (2005) [4], the terrorist attack on the Amenas gas
plant that affected more than 10% of Algerian production of
natural gas (2013) [5], and the supply shortage in March 2013,
when the UK had only 6 hours worth of gas left in storage as a
buffer [6]. New vulnerabilities could come from cyber attacks
to the infrastructure [1], particularly in the case of state-driven
attacks [2]; be the result of prolonged uncertainty or inaction
on energy security in the US or Europe [7]; or derive from
an extended period of extremely volatile prices due to intense
international conflict [2].
Natural gas, a fossil fuel that accounts for 24% of energy
consumption in OECD-Europe [8], has been at the heart of
these crises. Gas is expensive to transport, and this is done
mainly over a pipeline network. The investments are large
and are made with long-term horizons, often of decades, and
the costs are covered by locking buyers into long-term con-
tracts [9]. Moreover, current infrastructure investments in
Europe still derive from a historical dependency on supply
from Russia and North Africa [10]. This dependency leaves
the European continent exposed to both a pipeline network that
was not designed to transport large quantities of gas imported
via Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, and to the effects
of political and social instabilities in countries that are heavily
dependent either on the export of natural gas (e.g., Algeria,
Libya, Qatar or Russia) or its transit (e.g., Ukraine). Hence, it
is challenging to build infrastructure that will be resilient to a
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FIG. 1. Spatial data layers involved in our analysis: population
density (Landscan 2012); gas pipeline network and Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) terminals (Platts 2011); and major urban areas (European
Environment Agency and Natural Earth).
wide range of possible crisis scenarios [11].
In a crisis, less delivery may mean greater congestion. This
is due to the breakdown of major transit routes or production
losses in affected areas, which cause the supply network to be
used in different ways from what it was designed for. Hence,
the available resources cannot be distributed well with the
remaining transport capacities [12] [13, 14]. This is why we
need a method to handle congestion.
To manage the gas pipeline network during crises, we pro-
pose a decentralized model of congestion control that dis-
tributes the available network capacity to each route, without
sacrificing network throughput [21–23]. A central controller
makes the system vulnerable both to attacks on the control
centre and to delays and failures of the lines of communication
through the network [21]. In contrast, a decentralized method
is more resilient to failures because damage to the network
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2has only a local effect and the need for communication is re-
duced. To illustrate our model, we analyse the throughput of
the present and planned pipeline networks across a range of
different crisis scenarios at European, country and urban levels.
The most challenging scenario corresponds to a hypothetical
crisis with Russia with a complete cut-off of supply to Europe.
We analyse how to alleviate the impact of such scenarios, by the
identification of country groups with similar interests, which
should cooperate closely to manage congestion on the network.
This acknowledges that many of the 21st century challenges,
such as the management of energy grids and infrastructure
networks [15–17], cannot be solved by technology alone, but
do have a relevant behavioural or social component [18–20].
RESULTS
Data set and model
Our data set is organized in four layers (see Supplemen-
tary Information “Databases”), three of which are shown in
Figure 1. The first layer is the population density, which we
compute from the 2012 Landscan global population data set.
The second layer is the European gas pipeline network and
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, which we extract from
the Platts 2011 geospatial data set. This infrastructure is a spa-
tial network, where nodes and links are geographically located,
and links have capacity and length attributes. The third layer
is defined by the urban areas in Europe with 100, 000 or more
inhabitants, and we compile it from the European Environment
Agency and Natural Earth. The fourth layer is the network
of annual movements of gas via pipelines and of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) via shipping routes (see Figure 2). We
represent gas flowing from an exporting country m (including
LNG) to an importing country n, by a directed network with
weighted adjacency matrix Tmn.
Gas enters the network at source nodes, is transported over
long distances on the pipeline transmission network, and then
passed to the distribution network that delivers it to consumers.
Here we model only the transport of gas on the transmission
network. To model consumption spatially, we first need a
tessellation of each country into disjoint sets of urban and
non-urban areas, such that the pipeline network in an area
is associated with the population it serves. Urban areas are
naturally defined by the boundary of their spatial polygons. We
partition non-urban areas by a Voronoi tessellation with the
gas pipeline nodes as generators, respecting country borders
and excluding all urban areas (see Supplementary Information
“The Model”).
We assume that the flow of gas on each pipeline intersecting
an urban polygon (i.e., the border of the urban area) is directed
towards the centre of the urban area. For simplicity, we also
assume that such pipelines supply the urban area from the
closest node to the urban polygon that is located inside the
urban area. Moreover, each non-urban area is defined by a
Voronoi cell, and we assume that it is supplied by the cell
generator node (see Supplementary Information “The Model”).
To connect sink to source nodes with paths (see Contract
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FIG. 2. Natural gas imports by pipeline and via Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG) terminals in Europe during 2011 (million cubic meters).
Gas exporting (importing) countries are on the left (right) of the image.
For each exporting country, we show the breakdown of the volumes
of gas exported annually, together with the importing countries served.
For each importing country, we show the volumes of gas imported
annually, together with the diversity of supply.
Paths in Methods), we first go through each non-zero entry
in the Tmn transport matrix and link each sink node in an
importing country n to the Φmn = min(10, sm) closest nodes
in an exporting country m, if m is a country, or to all LNG
terminals in country n, if m is LNG, where sm is the number of
gas pipeline nodes in an exporting country m.
To allocate demand to individual paths, we start with the
observation that the demand Tmn of an importing country n
from an exporting country m is proportional to the population
of country n [24]. We next split the demand Tmn among all
source to sink paths between countries m and n, proportionally
to the population served by each sink node. We now have
a value of demand associated with each path, and therefore
with each sink node. Finally, we replace each path by a set of
identical paths, each having the minimum demand on the net-
work. This implies that all paths have the same demand, while
doubling the demand on a path is equivalent to creating two
identical paths with the original demand (see Supplementary
Information “The Model”).
To begin integrating routing and congestion control, we
first consider how to distribute the capacity ci of one single
congested link over the bi =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j paths that pass through
the link, where B is the link-path incidence matrix (Bi j = 1
if link i belongs to the path r j and Bi j = 0 otherwise), and
where ρ is the number of paths on the network (see Table 1
of the Supplementary Information “The Model”). To find the
exact routing for these paths, we apply an iterative algorithm
3that, for each source-sink pair, finds the path with minimum
effective path length, where the effective link length is given
by l˜i = (〈hi〉 /hi)α li, li is the length of link i, hi = ci/(1 + bi),
and α = 0.03 (see Supplementary Information “The Model”).
We consider two baseline scenarios: the present and future
networks. The present baseline scenario is the network that
has been operational since 2011; the future baseline scenario
extends the present network by the planned and under con-
struction pipelines. To determine the network effects of crises,
we analyse a range of scenarios that consist in hypothetically
removing exporting (e.g., Russia) or transit (e.g., Ukraine)
countries from the baseline scenarios. The scenarios are, thus,
identified by the baseline (present or future) and the hypo-
thetically removed country. For example, the present Russia
scenario is given by the present network excluding Russia,
that is removing all entries in the transport matrix Tmn that
are movements of gas originating in Russia. Similarly, the fu-
ture Ukraine scenario is determined by removing all Ukrainian
nodes and links from the future network.
Broadly, there are three strategies to manage congestion [25].
First, expanding the network capacity is the most obvious
way to lower congestion. The EU has a plan to build major
pipelines crossing the continent, that should lower European
dependency on Russia (see planned pipelines in Figure S1
of the Supplementary Information). Here, we include these
planned pipelines in the future scenarios, but make no sugges-
tions for extra infrastructure because the costs of expanding
network capacity are high, and thus our focus is on how to best
manage the existing and planned network capacity. Second,
implementing congestion pricing is a way to cap the consump-
tion of heavy users that cause network bottlenecks. Finally, by
identifying groups of countries that have similar patterns of
demand, we map a vast number of consumers to a relatively
small number of communities that may be able to cooperate
during crises [26].
We are aiming at controlling congestion in situations where
the network has to perform a function for which it was not de-
signed. For congestion control, we are using the proportional
fairness algorithm (see Methods), which is inspired by the way
capacity is managed on the Internet [21, 27, 28]. The main
idea behind proportional fairness is to use pricing on the links
in order to control congestion (see Methods and Supplemen-
tary Information “Congestion Control”). Use of non-congested
links is free up to a threshold, above which the cost that a path
incurs for using a link increases linearly, but steeply, with the
difference between link capacity and link utilization. Hence,
paths that traverse many congested links pay a high cost for
contributing to congestion, and thus get a smaller flow alloca-
tion than paths that avoid congestion. A flow is proportionally
fair if, to increase a path flow by a percentage ε, we have to
decrease a set of other path flows, such that the sum of the
percentage decreases is larger or equal to ε. We view the net-
work as an optimizer and the proportional fairness policy as a
distributed solution to a global optimization problem [29, 30].
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FIG. 3. Global network throughput by scenario. (A) A scenario
is named after the country that is hypothetically removed from the
network, and coloured in blue (orange) if the country is removed from
the present (future) baseline scenario. (B) The country removed per
scenario is coloured cyan (red) on the map, if it is an exporting (transit)
country. The total network throughput increases by 6.3% from the
present baseline to the future baseline scenario (i.e., when the future
and planned pipelines are added to the present network). The most
challenging scenarios are the hypothetical removal of Russia, followed
by Ukraine, the Netherlands and LNG. When Russia is removed from
the network, the global network throughput falls by 32.7% relative to
the present baseline and by 28.1% in relation to the future baseline.
Simulation Results
For each scenario, we hypothetically remove the scenario
country from the network and, if m is an exporting country,
remove row m in the Tmn transport matrix. Since the network
topology and the flow network Tmn depend on the scenario,
we then re-compute the source-sink pairs, the demand of each
pair, and we also replace every source-sink path with a number
of identical paths, each having the minimum demand in the
network. Finally, we apply the proportional fairness conges-
tion control algorithm to the resulting network and paths. We
assume that all countries are willing to cooperate, that is, ad-
here to the rules of the congestion control policy. To assess the
effect of the range of scenarios, we then analyse the throughput
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FIG. 4. Heat-map [31], illustrating the variation of throughput across various scenarios and the effect of a scenario on the network. The
dendrograms are computed using a hierarchical clustering algorithm with the Euclidean norm and average linkage clustering. (A) Heat-map of
throughput at country level across various scenarios, allowing for a comparative analysis of the present versus future baseline scenarios, as well
as of crises versus baseline scenarios; (B) Coefficient of variation of throughput per capita of a country; (C) Heat-map of throughput at urban
level; (D) Coefficient of variation of throughput at urban scale. The gray areas denote groups of countries and urban areas that share common
patterns of throughput across scenarios.
5at the scales of the European continent, countries, and of urban
areas.
We compute the global network throughput, which is the
sum of the throughput at all sinks (urban and non-urban), for
all the scenarios. Our model reproduces successfully the ex-
pected consequences of removing the major source and transit
countries from the network (see Figure 3).
We say that a country is resilient to crises if it combines high
throughput per capita across scenarios with a low coefficient of
variation of throughput. In addition, the network is considered
resilient to a scenario if the vectors of country throughput per
capita for the scenario and the baseline scenario are similar.
To start addressing the resilience of countries and the network
to supply and transit crises, we study the signatures in the
scenario space given by the country throughput per capita in
each of the 20 scenarios. Similarly, a scenario can be seen as a
point in the 32-dimensional space of country throughput. The
heat-map in Figure 4A shows the throughput per capita for
each pair of countries and scenarios [31].
The country groups, determined by dendrograms and high-
lighted in gray, reflect a similar level of throughput per capita
achieved across the scenarios. Countries belong to the high
throughput per capita groups (highlighted in dark gray in the
figure) due to a combination of effects: diversity of supply;
good access to network capacity (strategic geographical lo-
cation); and a relatively small population (see discussion in
Supplementary Information “Results”). The coefficient of vari-
ation, shown in Figure 4B for present and future scenarios,
measures the normalized dispersion of country throughput per
capita using the mean as a measure of scale. Larger values in-
dicate that the throughput accessible to a country varies across
scenarios. Figure 4B shows that countries in Eastern Europe
have high coefficient of variation of throughput per capita in the
scenarios where we hypothetically remove Russia or Ukraine.
In other words, countries in Eastern Europe are still very much
dependent on one single source country (Russia) and one ma-
jor transit country (Ukraine). Unexpectedly, we observe a
spillover effect from countries, such as Germany, which make
large investments in infrastructure. These countries themselves
seem to benefit less from such investments than some of their
smaller neighbours. The reason behind this spillover is that
countries with plentiful access to network capacity provide
routes for neighbouring countries to also access such capacity.
Figure 4A can be read from left to right: the scenarios that
cause the largest disruption appear on the left, and the most
benign scenarios are on the right. The present and future sce-
narios are clustered together when either Russia, Ukraine, the
Netherlands, or Belarus are removed from the network, demon-
strating that the new pipelines being built will only improve
slightly the consequences of a hypothetical crisis with one of
the major exporting countries (Russia or the Netherlands), or
with a critical transit country (Ukraine or Belarus). It is thus
very hard to change the consequences of such scenarios even
by building new pipelines.
We illustrate our model at a fine geographical scale in the
heat-map of Figure 4C, where we show the throughput for
urban areas in Europe with 1.5 million inhabitants or more, as
the scenarios vary. The figure suggests possible classifications
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FIG. 5. Network throughput of selected countries in a hypothetical
crisis with Russia. The right axis shows the country throughput rela-
tive to the present baseline scenario. To minimize the impact of the
loss of Russian supply, we re-allocate paths that originate in Russia
to Norway and the Netherlands (see Methods). We then partition
countries into two groups: group I is composed of Eastern Europe
(http://eurovoc.europa.eu/100277) together with Estonia, Fin-
land, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania, and group II includes all other
countries in our study. Group II countries have a demand of βT ′mn,
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Panels (A)–(C) show the throughput for selected
group I countries (open squares), whereas panels (D)–(F) illustrate
the throughput for group II countries (open circles). Panels (A)–(C)
demonstrate that countries in group I benefit from curtailing the de-
mand of countries in group II. In contrast, panels (D)–(E) show that
some countries in group II are largely unaffected even when their own
demand is curtailed considerably. Finally, panel (F) demonstrates that
supply to Austria is dominated by the demand reduction prefactor,
β. Indeed, Austria is crossed by routes from Norway and the Nether-
lands to group I countries, and these routes get a higher allocation of
available capacity as Austrian demand decreases (i.e., as β decreases).
of cities into groups, highlighted in gray. We observe in Fig-
ure 4D that the coefficient of variation is larger for cities in
Eastern Europe than for cities elsewhere (except Berlin, Vienna
and Dusseldorf). Note that Dublin is resilient to all scenarios
because it is supplied from the UK, which we never removed
from the network. Observe also that Austria gets most of its
gas from Russia, and only a little from Norway, so Vienna is
in a similar situation to Eastern European cities.
Taken together, Figures 4A–D illustrate the resilience of
countries, urban areas and the network to the scenarios, by
6showing how countries and urban areas with similar reactions
to different types of crises are grouped together by throughput
or by its coefficient of variation, and how different scenarios
are clustered by their effect on the countries and urban areas.
The most challenging scenario is a hypothetical crisis that
would cut-off supply from Russia to Europe. To investigate
how Europe could make use of its internal gas production to
minimize the impact of such a crisis, we simulate and quantify
the effect of replacing gas supply from Russia with supply
from Norway and the Netherlands. To do this, we start by
creating two groups of countries. Group I is made of the coun-
tries that are heavily dependent on Russian gas, and is defined
by Eastern Europe (http://eurovoc.europa.eu/100277)
together with Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania.
Group II is defined by all other countries in our study (see
Supplementary Information “Databases”). We consider a new
scenario where Russia is removed from the network and the
demand of countries in group I is rerouted to the Netherlands
and Norway. To do this, we first create new paths linking each
importing country in group I to Norway and the Netherlands
(see Supplementary Information “The Model”) and we update
the matrix of gas flows to T ′mn (see Methods). Next, we apply
a prefactor 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 to the values of the demand T ′mn of
countries in group II. The effect of β is to lower the utilization
of the network by countries of group II that do not depend
heavily on Russia. These countries typically have a high value
of demand, and hence by curtailing their demand, there will
be more capacity available to transport gas from Norway and
the Netherlands to group I countries. In Figure 5, we observe
that group I countries increase their access to network capacity
as β decreases. Group II countries, such as Austria, that are
geographically on the main routes that link Norway and the
Netherlands to group I countries, decrease their throughput
as β decreases. These countries are crucial: their throughput
decreases as they share their network to benefit the more popu-
lous group I countries. In contrast, access to network capacity
in routes supplying group II countries, such as Germany and
Italy, is broadly unaffected, even as β is lowered considerably,
because routes from Norway and the Netherlands to group I
countries use little network capacity from these group II coun-
tries. Despite the increase in throughput for countries in group
I as β decreases, Figure 5 shows the difficulty in replacing
Russia by the Netherlands and Norway. Although we can hope
to recover between 40 and 50% of the baseline throughput for
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we will only recover up to
5% of the Russian supply to Ukraine and up to 20% of the
Austrian supply.
DISCUSSION
Agreed political management processes are needed for crises
scenarios, to guarantee supply to the most affected countries
and urban areas and minimize the loss of gas by populations.
Here, we propose a decentralized algorithm inspired by con-
gestion control on the Internet, which would eliminate the need
of improvisation and complicated, lengthy negotiations every
time a crisis occurs. Such mechanism has a stabilizing effect
because it lowers the resource deficiency of the most affected
countries [11, 26]. We demonstrate how a wide range of scenar-
ios impacts network throughput at global, country and urban
levels, and how countries and urban areas react to scenarios of
hypothetical crises. We show and quantify how countries that
are heavily dependent on Russian supply can lower the impact
of a crisis, if other countries accept to reduce their demand.
Finally, our model tries to systematically compare alternative
policy options during energy crises, using complex system
models [34].
In summary, Europe is not necessarily trapped and helpless
during energy crises. The long-term interest in the sustain-
ability of the gas industry makes governments and the indus-
try likely to invest in rules and norms to enhance reciprocity
and collective efforts during crises. Because the number of
governments and companies ultimately involved in taking the
decisions in Europe is relatively high, governments could im-
plement decentralized solutions similar to the one we propose
here, perhaps with a centralized control solution as backup.
At its heart, energy security, like preparedness for future pan-
demics [36], is about cooperation among nations [1]. To avoid
European-wide crises, nations must cooperate to share access
to their critical infrastructure networks.
METHODS
Let G = (V, E, c, l) be an undirected and connected weighted
graph with no loops, node-set V and link-set E = {1, . . . , η}.
Each link i has a capacity ci and a length li. The network has
a set of ρ paths connecting source to sink nodes. All links of
a path transport the same path flow. Different paths can share
a link, even to perform transport in different directions (e.g.,,
during distinct time intervals).
The relationship between links and paths can be described
by the link-path incidence matrix B as follows. Set Bi j = 1
if the link i belongs to the path r j, and set Bi j = 0 otherwise.
Matrix B has dimensions η × ρ, and maps paths to the links
contained in these paths. When B is applied to a vector of path
flows, the resulting vector with components (B f )i =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j f j
is the total flow on the links, or link throughput. We say that a
link is a bottleneck if the sum of the path flows of paths that
pass through it is equal to the link capacity. We assume that
flows are elastic, that is that path flows are determined by the
available network capacity.
Contract paths
The pipeline contracts are for physical point-to-point trans-
port on a given system over a contract path [37]. The contract
path is a route between a pair of source and sink nodes, such
that gas flows from source to sink along that path and the
transport costs are only incurred on links along that route.
7Proportional fairness congestion control: a primal algorithm
A decentralized algorithm for congestion control (see Sup-
plementary Information “Congestion Control”) solves the sys-
tem of coupled ODEs:
d
dt
f j(t) = 1 − f j(t)
η∑
i=1
Bi jµi(t), (1)
where the price on link i is
µi(t) = pi
 ρ∑
j=1
Bi j f j(t)
 , (2)
and the price function is given by
pi(y) =
max(0, y − ci + )
2
, (3)
Proportional fairness congestion control: a dual algorithm
Consider a system where the shadow prices vary gradually
as a function of the path flows (see Supplementary Information
“Congestion Control”):
d
dt
µi(t) =
ρ∑
j=1
Bi j f j(t) − qi(µi(t)), (4)
where
f j(t) =
1∑η
i=1 Bi jµi(t)
, (5)
and q(·) is the inverse of p(·). As  → 0, the dual and primal
algorithms become equivalent.
Rerouting the demand from Russia to the Netherlands and
Norway
When Russia is removed from the network, we reroute paths
between group I countries and Russia to paths between group I
countries and the Netherlands and Norway. To do this, we pair
the new source and sink nodes as described in Supplementary
Information “The Model”, but we modify the Tmn matrix of
gas flows. The new T ′mn matrix is found by reallocating the
demand from Russia for group I countries to the Netherlands
and Norway, proportionally to the production of gas of these
two exporting countries:
T ′(NO)n = aNOT(RU)n
T ′(NL)n = aNLT(RU)n,
(6)
where aNO =
∑
j T(NO) j∑
j T(NO) j+T(NL) j
and aNL =
∑
j T(NL) j∑
j T(NO) j+T(NL) j
are the
normalised proportions of supply from Norway and the Nether-
lands, respectively.
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9Supplementary Information: Resilience of
natural gas networks during conflicts,
crises and disruptions
S1. DATABASES
The data set is illustrated on Figures S1 and S2 and is the
result of compiling GIS and population databases into several
layers.
A. First layer: population
We use the 2012 LandScan [S1] high-resolution global popu-
lation distribution data that estimates the population count with
a spatial resolution of approximately 1 km, or 30 × 30 seconds
of arc (see http://www.ornl.gov/sci/landscan/).
B. Second layer: the gas pipeline network
We compiled the European gas pipeline transmission net-
work and the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals from
the 2011 Platts Natural Gas geospatial data (see http://www.
platts.com/Products/gisdata), including pipelines that
are planned or under construction. The data set covers 25
of the 27 EU member states (except Malta and Cyprus), Be-
larus, Moldova, Western Russia, Ukraine (all part of the for-
mer USSR), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia,
Serbia (all part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia), Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia (all part of the
Maghreb), Norway, Switzerland and Western Turkey.
Similarly to electrical power grids, gas pipeline networks
have two layers: transmission and distribution. The trans-
mission network transports natural gas over long distances
(typically across countries) and has a non-trivial topology. The
distribution network is tree-like and comprises pipelines with
smaller diameter that deliver gas to consumers. We extract the
gas pipeline transmission network as all the important pipelines
with diameter d ≥ 15 inches. To finalize the network, we add
pipelines interconnecting major branches, so that the resulting
network is connected. Network links are weighted by pipeline
diameter and length. To simplify, we assume that gas can flow
on both directions of a pipeline, although over different time
periods. The compiled network has 2, 649 nodes (compressor
stations, city gate stations, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) ter-
minals, etc.) connected by 3, 673 pipeline segments spanning
186, 132 km.
C. Third layer: urban areas
To avoid the controversy in the definition of an urban
area [S2, Ch IV, p 49], we considered only urban areas with
100, 000 or more inhabitants as defined by the Eurostat urban
audit (see http://www.urbanaudit.org). We are interested
not just in the administrative boundaries of cities, but intend
also to capture the surrounding areas that include a substantial
share of the commuters into the city, since the gas pipeline
infrastructure also supplies these peripheral urbanized districts.
Note that the infrastructure network supplies directly the major
urban areas, but may not intersect spatially with the built-up
area of cities.
Urban areas in the European Union member countries
and candidate countries are defined by Eurostat as Larger
Urban Zones (http://www.urbanaudit.org), and the
GIS files are provided by the European Environment
Agency (http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/
data/urban-atlas). The city levels in non-EU coun-
tries are defined from remotely sensed data (see [S3]
and http://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/
10m-cultural-vectors/10m-urban-area/). These city
level areas are too small compared with the EU Larger
Urban Zones. Hence, we define an urban area in non-EU
countries to be the union of the third-level administrative
divisions (http://www.gadm.org/) that intersect the
corresponding city level polygon. We have found 376 urban
areas with a total area of 723, 957 km2.
D. Fourth layer: network of gas movements by pipeline and
LNG
The fourth layer is the network of annual movements of gas
by pipeline and of Liquefied Natural Gas by ship into Euro-
pean terminals, collected from the International Energy Agency
Natural Gas Information Statistics for 2011 [S4] (see http:
//www.oecd-ilibrary.org/statistics). This directed
network is represented by the weighted adjacency matrix Tmnof
gas transported from m to n, where m stands either for a gas
exporting country or for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) termi-
nals that supply an importing country n (see Figure 2 of the
main paper). We make use of ISO alpha-2 country codes in
m and n to denote individual countries (see http://www.iso.
org/iso/home/standards/country_codes.htm), so that,
for example, T(RU)(FR) is the amount of gas imported annually
by France from Russia.
S2. THE MODEL
A. Tessellation of urban and non-urban areas and location of
source and sink nodes
For simplicity, we consider that all nodes in a gas exporting
country are source nodes. The partition of non-urban areas
is such that all points within a given Voronoi cell are closer
to their corresponding gas pipeline node than to any other
node. If a gas pipeline node is inside an urban polygon, we
call it an urban node, otherwise, we say the node is non-urban.
To simplify, we assume that an urban area is supplied by the
pipeline links that cross its border and have a node inside its
polygon. This node turns out to be also the urban node on the
pipeline that is the closest to the border of the urban polygon,
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FIG. S1. European gas pipeline network including part of North Africa. The present network is shown in dark blue, and the planned pipelines
are shown in red. The population density is plot in dark green and Larger Urban Zones are indicated in cyan.
and is thus the first node that gas will cross along the pipeline
when entering the urban area. Hence, we naturally say that the
node is an urban sink, and we consider no other sink nodes
along the pipeline for the given urban area. If an urban area
polygon contains no gas nodes, we associate it to the closest
gas node (urban or not) and say this node is a sink. We exclude
pipeline links that have both end nodes located inside urban
areas. In other words, we only consider pipeline links that have
one urban and one non-urban node (see Figures S3 and S4).
B. How we pair sink and source nodes
Source nodes are either located in an exporting country m,
or at Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals. When m stands
for a country, we connect by a path rm,k,n,l (k = 1, . . . ,Φmn and
l = 1, . . . , tn) the tn sinks in an importing country n to the Φmn
closest source nodes in the exporting country m, where
Φmn =
{
min(10, sm) if m is a gas exporting country
gn if m is LNG
.
(S1)
In other words, when m is a country, we connect each sink
node in an importing country n to a maximum of ten source
nodes in an exporting country m. When m stands for LNG, we
assume that sink nodes in an importing country n are supplied
from all the LNG terminals in country n (see summary of the
notation in Table 1).
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C 5CCC RCCCC R5CCC p7CCC
Number of cities with
> 100,000 inhabitants
Number
terminals
of LNG
RR57p
Length of transmission network (km)
Present Future
Switzerland R5Rp
Lithuania RCR9
Netherlands p85R
Latvia 7RC
Ireland 88p
United6Kingdom 78666A 8pP7
Macedonia 8G
Bulgaria R8576A pp5R
France 7pCP6A 76RP
Hungary GGpR6A G65C
Denmark 9R7
Estonia PG5
Finland GpC
Italy RpP866A RPp5P
Luxembourg R95
Austria R9596A pCC6
Belgium R57G
68P6pp6A
Czech6Republic Gp8R
Croatia RC85
Bosnia6Herzegovina 8C
Ukraine Rp69C
Moldova 9Pp
Belarus pRpG
Germany
p5RCC6A p6CCP
Greece 8756A R9R7
Sweden G5G
Spain 8Gp56A
Slovenia P5C
Slovakia p8RG
Romania GRp56A G66P
Portugal 6C96A6 99p
Poland GPG8
Serbia6and6Montenegro
FIG. S2. Number of urban areas and Liquefied Natural Gas terminals, and length of the present and planned gas pipeline networks of the
countries analysed.
C. How we define demand
We define the demand of a country to be the amount of gas
imported over the gas pipeline network and Liquefied Natural
Gas terminals, as given by the Tmn matrix (see Figure 2 of the
main paper), and the demand of a given geographical area to
be the demand of the country weighted by the ratio between
the area and the country populations. Since demand for energy
is proportional to population [S5], we locate the sink nodes
and associate them with the population they supply. When the
area is urban, we split its total population equally among the
sink nodes inside the urban polygon. If an urban area contains
no gas nodes inside its polygon, we add its population to the
population associated with the closest gas node. In non-urban
areas, we associate the gas pipeline node at centre of a Voronoi
cell with the population of the cell. Because each sink node
in an importing country n is connected by Φmn paths to source
nodes in an exporting country m, each of these paths has a
share of the demand Tmn given by
Dmnl =
1
Φmn
ZnlTmn
zn
(S2)
where Znl is the population associated with sink node l of
importing country n, zn is the population of importing country
n, Tmn is the volume of gas imported by an importing country
n from an exporting country m, and the number Φmn of paths
from an exporting country m to each sink node is given by
equation (S1) (see summary of the notation in Table 1).
We next express the demand of a path in units of the mini-
mum demand on the network. To do this, we note that Dmnl
is independent of k, and we replace path rm,k,n,l having de-
mand Dmnl by Dmnl paths identical to rm,k,n,l, each with demand
min(Dmnl), where
Dmnl =
⌊
Dmnl
min(Dmnl)
⌋
, (S3)
where b·c is the largest integer not greater than ·. We note
that the demand of a sink node from a source node is now
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proportional to the number of paths connecting the source and
sink pair.
The path notation rm,k,n,l has been useful so far to locate the
origin and destination of the paths, but the congestion control
algorithm uses matrix multiplication, and it is simpler from
now on to index paths in the network by an integer. To do this,
we loop through all pairs of exporting and importing countries
with a non-zero entry in the T matrix and re-label each of the
Dmnl source-sink paths identical to rm,k,n,l by the new index. In
other words, for each pair of importing-exporting countries, we
go through the DmnlΦmntn shortest paths that connect source
to sink nodes (see Table 1), and we index all paths in increas-
ing order of first m, then n and finally k. Now that we have
allocated the source to sink paths, we update the number of
paths on the network ρ =
∑ν
i=1
∑ν
j=1
∑tn
l=1 DmnlΦmnT̂mn, where
T̂mn = 1 if Tmn is positive and zero otherwise, and we write r j
to denote path j, where j = 1, . . . , ρ.
D. The problem with shortest path routing
The pattern of route intersection determines how much the
paths condition each other in their sharing of network links,
and the capacity of links limits how much can be transported
locally. If the network is not congested, transport over the
geographical shortest paths minimizes the costs. In contrast,
shortest path routing in congested networks can be inefficient,
because it may cause congestion at a few overloaded links,
while avoiding alternative routes that are only slightly longer
but have higher capacity. Moreover, routing over shortest paths
in gas pipeline networks makes the effect of congestion even
worst. Indeed, parallel routes with similar capacity are often
available, but only one of these routes is the shortest path
(see Figure S5), and hence the network capacity is largely
underused.
E. How we determine the source to sink paths
To begin integrating routing and congestion control, we
consider first how to distribute the capacity ci of a congested
link i over the 1 + bi = 1 +
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j paths that pass through the
link when we add a new path through i, where B is the link-path
incidence matrix (Bi j = 1 if the link i belongs to the path r j and
Bi j = 0 otherwise). An equitable way to divide the capacity on
the link is to assign a path flow of hi = ci/(1 + bi) to each of
the 1 + bi paths. Intuitively, hi is the slice of capacity allocated
in a fair way to each of the bi paths that share the capacity ci,
and the split is viewed as a fair outcome [S6]. Moreover, 1/hi
can be interpreted as a simple measure of network congestion,
since it has a maximum at the most congested link [S7]. Hence,
we combine routing and congestion through an effective link
length:
l˜i =
( 〈hi〉
hi
)α
li, (S4)
A
B
A
B
Urban Areas
A
B
1. Identification of urban nodes
2. Selection of pipelines intersecting 
    urban polygons
3. Definition of urban nodes as 
    urban sinks
gas node (not source)
urban node
urban sink
FIG. S3. Schematic figure illustrating the allocation of sink nodes.
Urban sink nodes are shown in red, urban nodes that are not sinks are
shown in yellow, and non-urban sink nodes are shown in blue.
where 〈hi〉 is the average of hi over all network links, li is the
length of link i, and 0 ≤ α < 1. Whereas we weight links by
their length li in the calculation of geographical shortest paths,
we now weight each link by l˜i in the calculation of weighted
shortest paths. Thus, a link becomes less attractive (its effective
length is increased) if it is more congested than the average.
We find that the global network throughput is maximized for
α = 0.03 (see Figure S6), and thus we use this value in the
simulations.
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We define the effective path length
←→
l j of path j as the sum
of the effective lengths of each of its links. We interpret the
sum of link weights on a path as a penalty, which we then use
to reroute paths iteratively via the following heuristic [S8]. We
i) go through each source and sink node pair and find a new
path j connecting the two nodes; ii) if this new path has lower
value of
←→
l j than the previously found path, then it replaces the
existing source to sink path; iii) we recompute the weights l˜i
for all links on the new paths and repeat the procedure for all
paths, until it has been executed 20 times (we found that the
solution is does not change significantly when the number of
iterations is larger than 20).
S3. CONGESTION CONTROL
How should we allocate scarce network resources to compet-
ing paths so as to manage network congestion? There are two
mechanisms at play in such allocation. On one hand, maximiz-
ing the flow transported on the network may lead to some paths
being assigned a zero share of network capacity, and hence
zero path flow. These paths are effectively blocked from using
the network, and hence the flow allocation is unfair. On the
other hand, allocations that share network capacity fairly are
known to deliver low throughput and are thus inefficient [S7].
Hence, a good solution to the problem of congestion control
aims at a trade-off between efficiency and fairness.
How should we generalize equation (S4) when paths pass
through several congested links on the network? Our intuitive
notion of fairness breaks down on networks, because paths
typically cross several congested links and hence share the
capacity of these links with other paths. Roughly, a solution
is to allocate path flows iteratively, such that at each iteration
we increase all path flows that do not pass through existing
bottleneck links by the slice of capacity that is found by sharing
equitably the capacity of the most congested links. The slice
of capacity available to each path is the smallest on the most
congested links, that is, the ratio h is the smallest on these links.
A procedure to do this finds one link i, with the smallest ratio hi
and increases all path flows by hi. Such procedure distributes
parsimoniously the capacity of link i among the paths that
pass through the link, and increases all unsaturated path flows
by hi. The procedure then fixes the path flows of the paths
that cross links with capacity ci, and decreases the capacity
of links crossed by these paths by the amount of flow fixed.
This creates a residual network, on which the procedure is then
repeated, such that path flows are saturated and the capacity
available at the links they cross is updated at each iteration.
The procedure is repeated until all paths in the network are
saturated. Such allocation is known as max-min fair[S7, S9], a
name that comes from the way that path flows with minimum
allocation are maximized by splitting equitably the capacity
at the bottleneck links in an iterative process. The max-min
fair allocation is such that to increase a path flow we have to
decrease another path flow that is already smaller.
The major limitation of the max-min fair method is that
network throughput is low compared to max-flow. To under-
stand the mechanism behind this, we have to look at how both
max-min fair and max-flow allocate path flows. The efficient
allocation (max-flow) privileges short, over long paths that
pass through several bottleneck links. Long paths take up
capacity from other paths at each bottleneck, but only con-
tribute to network throughput at the sink node. Hence, network
throughput is maximized by minimizing the share of capacity
to the long paths that pass through many bottlenecks, so that
shorter paths can get a higher allocation of capacity and thus
provide a higher contribution to network throughput. On the
other hand, the max-min fair allocation shares the capacity of
bottlenecks among the paths that pass through them. Thus,
unlike max-flow, max-min fair allocations do not restrict the
amount of network capacity that long paths can consume and
are often inefficient. This limitation prompted the search for
a trade-off between max-min fairness and max-flow, which
would still distribute network capacity in an equitable way, and
thus proportional fairness appeared in the late 1990s.
A. Proportional Fairness
Both proportional fairness and max-min fairness share the
capacity ci of a single link among N paths in a fair way, so that
each path gets a path flow of ci/N, but the two allocations are
distinct when operating on a network.
Definition 1 A vector of path flows f ∗ = ( f ∗1 , . . . , f
∗
ρ ) is pro-
portionally fair if it is feasible and if for any other feasible
vector of path flows f , the sum of proportional changes in the
path flows is non-positive [S10, S11]:
ρ∑
j=1
f j − f ∗j
f ∗j
6 0. (S5)
If there were no capacity constraints, equation (S5) would
be verified when f ∗j = ∞ for all j = 1, . . . , ρ. The capacity
constraints imply that a flow allocation f ∗ is proportionally fair
if all other feasible vector of path flows f j = (1 + δ j) f ∗j , for
δ ∈ Rρ where j = 1, . . . , ρ, verify that the aggregate of percent
changes
∑ρ
j=1 δ j is non-positive.
Theorem 1 The unique set of feasible paths flows that maxi-
mizes the function U( f ) =
∑ρ
j=1 log( f j) is proportionally fair.
Proof. The proof given here is a direct application of the
properties of convex functions [S12, S13] and global maxima
of a function (a sketch of the proof is given in [S14]). First,
observe that the set of feasible path flows is compact (closed
and bounded) and convex. The functions log( f j) are strictly
concave, and thus U( f ) is strictly concave, since it is the sum
of strictly concave functions. Thus U( f ) has a unique global
maximum. Second, note that the tangent plane at any point of
a convex (concave) function lies below (above) the graph of
the function. Hence, since U( f ) is concave:
∇U( f ) · (g − f ) > U(g) − U( f ). (S6)
Now assume that f is a proportionally fair allocation. Then,
∇U( f ) ·(g− f ) 6 0 from equation (S5), and thus U( f )−U(g) >
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FIG. S4. Urban sink nodes are highlighted in red for the Larger Urban Zones of (A) Hamburg and North West Germany, (B) Madrid, and (C)
Milan.
0 from equation (S6) for all other feasible g. Hence, f is a
global maximum of U. Conversely, assume that the function
U has one global maximum at U( f ). Then,
∇U( f ) · (g − f ) = lim
t→0+
U( f + t(g − f )) − U( f )
t
≤ 0,
and thus the flow allocation is proportionally fair. 
Theorem 2 If a vector f ∗ = ( f1, . . . , fρ) of path flows is pro-
portionally fair, then each path will pass through a bottleneck.
Proof. To see this, assume that there is one path r j that does
not pass through any bottleneck. Consider link i ∈ E(r j) on the
path r j. The path flow f j can be increased by δ = mini∈E(r j){ci−∑ρ
k=1 Bi,k fk} > 0, such that the new vector of path flows is
f ′ = ( f1, . . . , f j + δ, . . . , fρ). Hence, f ′ is not proportionally
fair because
∑ρ
q=1( f
′
q − fq)/ fq = δ/ f j > 0, and the path flow f j
can be increased. 
B. A centralized algorithm for Proportional Fairness
Now in order to find the proportionally fair allocation, we
need to maximize U( f ), constrained to the vector of path flows
15
FIG. S5. Detail of the gas pipeline network in Italy, showing the presence of parallel routes.
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FIG. S6. Plot of the global network throughput in the present
and future baseline scenarios when we apply the heuristic routing
algorithm of Equation (S4). Horizontal lines are a guide for the
eye and show network throughput in the present and future baseline
scenarios with shortest path routing. We choose the value α = 0.03
that maximizes the global throughput.
being feasible, that is:
maximize
f
U( f ) =
ρ∑
j=1
log( f j)
subject to B f ≤ c
f j ≥ 0,
(S7)
where the link-path incidence matrix is defined by Bi j = 1 if
the link i belongs to the path r j and Bi j = 0 otherwise, and c =
(c1, . . . , cη) is the vector of link capacities. The aggregate utility
U( f ) is concave and the inequality constraints are convex, and
hence the optimization problem (S7) is convex. Thus, any
locally optimal point is also a global optimum and we can
use results from the theory of convex optimization to solve
problem (S7) (see [S15] and [S16] for a brief introduction
to Lagrange multipliers, and [S17] on convex optimization).
The Lagrangian associated with the optimization problem (S7)
is [S10, S11]:
L( f , µ) =
ρ∑
j=1
log( f j) + µT (c − B f ) (S8)
where µ = (µ1, . . . , µη) is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. The
Lagrange dual function [S17] is then given by sup f L( f , µ),
which is easily determined analytically by ∂L( f ∗, µ∗)/∂ f = 0
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as
∂L( f ∗, µ∗)
∂ f ∗j
=
1
f ∗j
−
η∑
i=1
Bi jµ∗i = 0⇔
f ∗j =
1∑η
i=1 Bi jµ
∗
i
, (S9)
and thus
sup
f
L( f , µ) = −
ρ∑
j=1
log
 η∑
i=1
Bi jµi
 + η∑
i=1
µici − ρ (S10)
After removing the constant term in equation (S10) and con-
verting to a maximization problem, we obtain the dual prob-
lem [S10, S11]
maximize
L
V(µ) =
ρ∑
j=1
log
 η∑
i=1
Bi jµi
 − η∑
i=1
µici
subject to µi ≥ 0.
(S11)
The primal problem (S7) is convex and the inequality con-
straints are affine. Hence, Slater’s condition is verified and thus
strong duality holds. This means that the duality gap, i.e., the
difference between the optimal of the primal problem (S7) and
the optimal of the dual problem (S11), is zero [S17]. Strong
duality has potentially immense implications as, depending on
the problem, it may be easier to solve the primal or the dual.
In our case, the primal objective function depends on ρ vari-
ables (the path flows) and is constrained by an affine system of
equations, whereas the dual objective function depends on η
variables (the links) and is constrained only by the condition
that the Lagrange multipliers are non-negative. Taken together,
the methods of convex optimization provide us with powerful
tools to gain insights into patterns of congestion in networks
where the number ρ of transport routes can be considerably
larger than the number η of available transport links. Strong
duality then states that the optimal path flows f ∗ are related to
the optimal Lagrange multipliers µ∗ by equation (S9).
Since f ∗ maximizes the Lagrangian over f , it follows that
its gradient must vanish at f ∗, and thus the following KKT
condition is satisfied:
µ∗i
ci − ρ∑
j=1
Bi j f ∗j
 = 0. (S12)
Equation (S12), often referred to as complementary slack-
ness [S17], states that the vector µ of the Lagrange multipliers
and the vector of residual capacity have complementary spar-
sity patterns. To be more specific, either link i is utilized to
full capacity (i.e., ci =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j f
∗
j ) and µ
∗
i > 0, or µ
∗
i = 0 and
the capacity of link i is underused (i.e.,
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j f
∗
j < ci). This
gives us a simple and powerful way to identify bottleneck links
numerically, as the links with a positive Lagrange multiplier
µ∗i .
C. A centralized algorithm for Proportional Fairness with link
price
Now suppose that the network operator charges a price per unit
flow pi(y) for the use of link i, when the total load on the link is
y =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j f j. This means that the price at one link depends
on all the paths that pass through the link [S11]. Hence, the
problem (S7) can be generalized by adding a cost or penalty
that is a function of the price [S10, S11]. If the penalty is
infinite when the link capacity is exceeded, y > ci, then we can
generalize problem (S7) to replace the capacity constraints by
the link cost, such that
maximize
f
Û( f , p, y) =
ρ∑
j=1
log( f j) −
η∑
i=1
∫ yi
0
pi(z)dz
subject to B f = y
f j, yi ≥ 0.
(S13)
To derive the dual of problem (S13), we first find its Lagrange
dual
ĝ(µ) =
ρ∑
j=1
log
 1∑η
i=1 Bi jµi
 − ρ+
η∑
i=1
µi p−1i (µi) − ∫ p−1i (µi)
0
pi(z)dz

(S14)
To simplify equation (S14), we integrate by parts and then by
substitution,
ĝ(µ) =
ρ∑
j=1
log
 1∑η
i=1 Bi jµi
 − ρ + η∑
i=1
∫ µi
0
qi(x)dx, (S15)
where q(·) is the inverse of p(·). Following [S10, S11], we
now remove the constant term in equation (S15) and covert to
a maximization problem to obtain the dual of problem (S13):
maximize
L
V̂(µ, q) =
ρ∑
j=1
log
 η∑
i=1
Bi jµi
 − η∑
i=1
∫ µi
0
qi(x)dx
subject to µi ≥ 0.
(S16)
The dual problem (S16) is equivalent to the original dual
problem (S11) if qi(x) = ci. However, this function is non-
invertible and thus we approximate it by the invertible func-
tion [S10, S11]
qi(x) =
xci
x + 
. (S17)
Problems (S16) and (S11) are thus equivalent in the limit  → 0.
The primal problems (S7) and (S13) are equivalent in the limit
 → 0 if
pi(y) ∼ q−1i (y) = y/(ci − y). (S18)
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FIG. S7. Map of the flow allocation in the following scenarios: (A) present network, (B) present network without Algeria, (C) present network
without Belarus, (D) present network without Libya, and (E) present network without the Netherlands. Link thickness is proportional to the
total flow on the link. Links in dark red are bottlenecks and links in blue are not used to their full capacity. The scenario country, which is
hypothetically removed from the network, is highlighted in gray on the map.
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FIG. S8. Map of the flow allocation in the following scenarios: (F) present network without Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, (G)
present network without Norway, (H) present network without Poland, (I) present network without Russia, (J) present network without Ukraine.
Link thickness is proportional to the total flow on the link. Links in dark red are bottlenecks and links in blue are not used to their full capacity.
The scenario country, which is hypothetically removed from the network, is highlighted in gray on the map.
D. A decentralized algorithm for Proportional Fairness
The key to a decentralized algorithm for Proportional Fairness
is to translate the problem (S13) into an autonomous system
of coupled differential equation, with a fixed point equivalent
to the optimal solution of the optimization problem. To do
this, we use the result that the stable fixed point of a system
of differential equations is the maximum of the equations’
Lyapunov function
For each path r j, the network is offering a certain path flow f j
with unit rate of change, d f j/dt = 1. Now suppose that the
network operator charges a price per unit flow pi(y) for the use
of link i, when the total load on the link is y =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j f j. This
means that the price at one link depends on all the paths that
pass through the link. The price causes a reduction in the path
flow f j, such that
d
dt
f j(t) = 1 − f j(t)
η∑
i=1
Bi jµi(t), (S19)
where the price on link i is
µi(t) = pi
 ρ∑
j=1
Bi j f j(t)
 . (S20)
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FIG. S9. Map of the flow allocation in the following scenarios: (A) future network, (B) future network without Algeria, (C) future network
without Belarus, (D) future network without Libya, and (E) future network without the Netherlands. Link thickness is proportional to the
total flow on the link. Links in dark red are bottlenecks and links in blue are not used to their full capacity. The scenario country, which is
hypothetically removed from the network, is highlighted in gray on the map.
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FIG. S10. Map of the flow allocation in the following scenarios: (F) future network without Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals, (G) future
network without Norway, (H) future network without Poland, (I) future network without Russia, (J) future network without Ukraine. Link
thickness is proportional to the total flow on the link. Links in dark red are bottlenecks and links in blue are not used to their full capacity. The
scenario country, which is hypothetically removed from the network, is highlighted in gray on the map.
User i responds to an underused capacity with a steady in-
crease of its path flow, and to congestion with a multiplicative
decrease of its path flow at a rate proportional to the congestion
price. This additive-increase/multiplicative-decrease mecha-
nism is best known for its use in communication networks, and
is implemented in TCP congestion avoidance [S18, S19].
A possible pricing policy consists in charging only for link
flows that are close to capacity, with a sharp increase in the
price that each path pays as the link becomes saturated:
pi(y) =
max(0, y − ci + )
2
. (S21)
As  → 0, the price pi tends to zero for link flows below capac-
ity, and to infinity for saturated links. Hence, problem (S13)
approximates arbitrarily closely the primal problem (S7).
S4. RESULTS
Figures S7, S8, S9 and S10 show the load on network links in
the present and future scenarios. These figures demonstrate
that our model reproduces the main transport corridors in Eu-
rope, and show the spatial pattern of bottleneck links for each
scenario. It is apparent how a hypothetical removal of either
Russia or Ukraine cuts-off the major transport routes, and dam-
ages drastically the supply of populations in Europe.
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Table 1. Summary of notation
Indexes:
i Link index
j Path index
m Exporting country
n Importing country
k Node index in an exporting country
l Node index in an importing country
Extracted at network level:
η Number of links in the network
di Diameter of link i (units: in; vector with dimension η)
ci = 0.56d2.5i Capacity of link i. The exponent 2.5 is found from data [S20], and the prefactor
is obtained by calibrating the present baseline scenario to match the Tmn
flow matrix (units: Mm3/year; vector with dimension η)
li Length of link i (units: km; vector with dimension η)
Bi j Link-path incidence matrix. Bi j = 1 if the link i belongs to the path r j and
Bi j = 0 otherwise (matrix with dimensions η × ρ)
bi =
∑ρ
j=1 Bi j Number of paths that pass through link i (vector with dimension η)
Extracted at country level:
ν Number of countries
sm Number of (source) nodes in an exporting country m
tn Number of sink nodes in an importing country n
gn Number of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals in an importing country n
Tmn Volume of gas received by an importing country n from an exporting country m
and LNG (matrix with dimensions: (η + 1) × η)
T̂mn =
{
1 if Tmn is positive
0 otherwise Binary matrix with zero entries if there is no transport between countries m and n
Znl Population associated with sink node l of importing country n
(matrix with dimensions ν× [Number of Voronoi and urban sinks])
zn Population of an importing country n
Computed for the routing:
ρ Number of paths on the network
rm,k,n,l Path connecting source node k in an exporting country m with sink node l
in an importing country n, where k = 1, . . . ,Φmn if m is an exporting country
and k = 1, . . . , gn if m is LNG
r j Paths are also indexed by an integer, to simplify the notation
used in the congestion control algorithm (vector with dimension ρ)
hi = ci/(1 + bi) Share of capacity allocated to each path passing through link i
at the beginning of the heuristic rerouting
Dmnl Demand of sink l in an importing country n satisfied by an exporting country m
Dmnl =
⌊
Dmnl
min(Dmnl)
⌋
Number of identical paths between a source and sink pair,
each having demand min(Dmnl)
l˜i =
( 〈hi〉
hi
)α
li Effective length of link i←→
l j Effective length of path j (vector with dimension ρ)
Parameters:
α = 0.03 Exponent of 〈h〉/h in equation (S4) (see also Figure S6)
Φmn =
{
min(10, sm) if m is a country
gn if m is LNG
If m is a country, we connect each sink node to the min(10, sm)
geographically closest nodes in an exporting country m
(distance measured along network paths); if m is LNG, we connect
each sink node to the gn LNG terminals in an importing country n.
Congestion control algorithm:
f j Path flow on path j (dimension ρ)
µi Price on link i, and dual of f j (vector with dimension η)
pi Price function on link i (vector with dimension η)
qi Inverse of pi (vector with dimension η)
L( f , µ) Lagrangian function of the primal problem
V(µ) Lagrangian function of the dual problem
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A. Detailed interpretation of results at country and urban
levels
At country level:
• Greece receives its gas from diverse sources, and thus
is resilient to the scenarios we analyse. It gets most of
its gas from Russia (65.2%), from Turkey (16.4%) and
LNG (18.4%);
• Ireland gets its gas from the UK and is unaffected by our
scenarios, since the UK is a secure source in our model;
• Switzerland acts like a hub between South and Northern
Europe, so it has very good access to network capacity;
• Ukraine is a major transit route for gas to Europe;
• Latvia and Finland have a relatively small population,
good access to network capacity and are very close to
Russia;
• Surprisingly, Belarus does better when Ukraine is re-
moved from the network. The apparent contradiction
is solved by realizing that Europe’s supply from Rus-
sia has been historically built around Ukraine. Hence,
Ukrainian routes have higher capacity and shorter routes
to central Europe than routes that pass through Belarus.
In contrast, when Ukraine is removed from the network,
routes through Belarus become the first choice to supply
central Europe;
• Belgium draws its high energy security from diversifi-
cation of supply. It gets its gas from the Netherlands
(42.5%), from Norway(48.7%, including LNG), Russia
(2.8%), Germany (1.2%), and the UK (4.8%).
At urban level:
• Surprisingly, Rome seems to gain slightly from remov-
ing Libya. Rome is approximately in the middle of the
Italy, and the country is supplied both from the South
and from the North. When Libya is removed there is no
need to transport gas from the South to the North of Italy
and this frees capacity to bring more gas from the North
to Rome;
• Unexpectedly, Berlin gains from the removal of Poland.
Germany is transporting gas to Poland. When Poland is
removed, the capacity that is freed can be used for Ger-
man cities located close to the Polish border, including
Berlin;
• Finally, Dublin is resilient to all scenarios because it gets
all of its supply from the UK, and we do not have any
scenario affecting the ability of UK to supply gas.
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